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PANEL lV: DISCUSSION
TRANSCRIPT
CLAIRE KELLY: Thank you. I think we're going to open
up the floor for discussion on this issue now if you have any
questions. Yes, Phil.
PHILIP WEST: First of all I comment on someone who I
think has the rare distinction of being the only person who is
involved in both the only tax case ever to be brought under the
NAFTA involving the United States and the FSC case, which
is... and I have to say there are a couple of things about the
NAFTA case. One is that it was the most confusing case I was
ever involved with because the client's name was Martin
Feldman, and the lawyer's name was Marvin Feldman; and I
could never get the two correct. It didn't... well I probably
shouldn't comment on the merits. But, I will say that under
the NAFTA, the Assistant Secretary for tax policy in the Trea-
sury Department has granted extraordinary discretion in basi-
cally vetoing the ability of an agreed taxpayer to bring a case
against another country. In essence, the Assistant Secretary
can block a case from even going through arbitration under the
NAFTA. Obviously the situation in the WTO is quite different.
As Reuven Avi-Yonah pointed out, we've given up the veto that
we had under the new dispute resolution procedures. That has
led us to the situation that we're in with FSC.
On FSC, one political observation, David Hariton said
yesterday that on deferral, he viewed the whole debate as
political. If you look at the political dynamic surrounding the
DISC and FSC-the DISC was brought in I believe in the Ford
Administration, a Republican Administration, and was pushed.
Now you have FSC being avidly defended by a Democratic Ad-
ministration and there is a question as to whether this is the
new Democrats showing their face, or is this beef and bananas
showing their face, or is this something else? I don't know.
One point I wanted to make when Gary Hufbauer com-
mented on the FSC earlier was that he said he thought this
was a good opportunity for the deferral debate to be opened up.
I just think it would be, at the least, the tail wagging the dog,
if not a bizarre turn of events to have the exemption credit
deferral debate determined by what's essentially a niche export
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regime like FSC.
The last thing I want to say on FSC is that it's exactly
right. It's the footnote in the agreement that really creates the
difficulty in interpretation. The opinion-I think I have not fo-
cused on that before-would also create an impediment to
bringing a case against the European exemption systems now.
But, it's also the footnote that's imbedded in the agreements. I
also hadn't focused on the fact that it is undeniably true that
the exemption systems are, to the extent that they're alleviat-
ing double taxation, that is at the root of what we think is
appropriate for an exemption system to do. And, if the lan-
guage is so circumscribed that it's only within those bound-
aries that they get a buy, then maybe there was more there
than we focused on.
A couple of narrow points on Ireland and whether that
rate is going to be a problem in the EU. I don't know where
this is going, but you just kind of hear sometimes behind the
scenes, people whisper "just wait." The Irish rate is going to be
the subject of some action in the future. It's not so ... while
you're right Paul, I think that right now they've dodged the
bullet. Whether that will continue in the future I'm not sure.
On the tax competition in the WTO, for those of you who
aren't familiar with it, you may know that the tax havens have
made some noise about bringing the OECD member countries
into the WTO and challenging their right to move against the
tax havens and the WTO. I think it's a fascinating perspective
to think that you actually may have a stronger stake. The
OECD member countries may have a stronger stake against
the tax havens and the WTO. I guess this is where Hugh Ault
is going to come in. Maybe the WTO has some merit as a fo-
rum for adjudicating that dispute.
On sovereignty, just an observation, you know everyone
that's concerned about treating sovereignty in the trade agree-
ment dispute resolution context. In the tax agreement dispute
resolution context, which is arbitration under our income tax
treaties, there seems to be a building consensus, at least in the
business community, that that's something we should do. It's
an interesting contrast because if there is political support for
treaty sovereignty in that context, you wonder whether there
might be, for those to whom consistency is important, less
ability to object to the treaty sovereignty in the trade agree-
ment context.
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Then the last thing is a question for Hugh. If this general
specific analytical framework of the dispute resolution panel is
not the right one, what is the right one?
HUGH AULT: No, I didn't say it wasn't the right one. I
said it's more easy to articulate in the abstract than it is to
apply in individual cases where you don't have the luxury of a
pure tax in any sense. When we're down in the nitty gritty of
the way tax systems are constructed from historical accident,
from conscious policy, from legislative mistake, then you have
to try to look at that and extrapolate from that what is the
general rule and what is the special rule where you can't have
the platonic form to help you. I agree that that's the approach
the OECD takes in general terms, that's the approach Reuven
Avi-Yonah's article takes, which OECD appreciated very much.
But I'm indicating that I think it's a little harder in practice
than in the somewhat denatured way that Paul described it.
CLAIRE KELLY: David?
DAVID BRADFORD: I confess I didn't have time to read
this paper. So what I've gotten from it is from Paul's exposi-
tion, which I thought was terrific. But, that may mean I
miss... maybe the questions may be dumb. But, the sort of
WTO and the general presumption in favor of free trade I
think you can think about is motivated by a couple of things.
One is, if I put a tax, a tariff, on import of something, that
may hurt worldwide welfare for the reasons-standard reasons
such as a distortion, et cetera-would fail to exploit all the
possible gains from trade. I think probably that general agree-
ment not to do that kind of thing is probably motivated by the
next step up, which is once you recognize that people may have
a tariff to protect their industry in some respect, then the
other guys will retaliate and we'll have a spiraling game, a
race to the bottom which will end up in a worse situation than
if we didn't, if we simply endured such a thing. I think that
maybe keeping that distinction in mind and thinking about
how that might apply to the tax area may be useful.
To some extent, what we want to probably do is avoid the
kind of competition that will make us all worse off. Now there
are provisions that pretty clearly affect worldwide welfare.
There was a lot of discussion after the big accelerated deprecia-
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tion that went into the first Reagan cuts in 1981. Well that
really had major impacts on worldwide capital markets and
probably had a bearing on worldwide welfare. That was quite
apart from any general political equilibrium response which
may be... who knows what that impact was.
I agree with you Paul. At that point, I began to think that
the nature of this argument is the same one we go through
when we go through the whole trade agreement convention
goods and services. The logic must carry over into the tax area.
However, I'm still not sure that you've hit, if I understand this
discussion, really hit the direct analogy for the trade context,
which isn't to say that's necessarily the right one either. But
the trade context specifically concerns cross-border transac-
tions. I mean there's no objection, I take it, under any of these
World Trade Organization provisions to my having a heavy tax
on peanut butter, provided it's not just for peanut butter pro-
duced in the United States. That's the issue. The analogy here
would be whether I tax, have a provision that specifically pro-
vides a plus or a minus for, I would think, investment located
in a particular country. I think that's what strikes me as the
analogy ... well, on things located in a particular country, and
that we might want to avoid provisions for that, which will
lead us to have a competitive process that will lead to bad
results in that regard.
Somehow I didn't feel like this discussion quite focused on
that point. That might be the wrong point; but if you really
want a direct analogy with the trades context, it seems to me
it's the cross-border aspect that's critical. In particular, I'm
very skeptical that you need anything like a normative tax
law, Maig Simon's or otherwise, to think about that. That
doesn't strike me... that strikes me as not quite right. I've
made the same point in connection with tax expenditures. Paul
will have heard me on that before. Somehow I don't think
that's not going to be the key question.
CLAIRE KELLY: Paul, did you want to respond?
PAUL MCDANIEL: Yes. Let me just say, and then I'll
start with this prior comment, given in an example in the
addendum to the paper; of where I think the European com-
munity may run into trouble in the absence of a special provi-
sion. Suppose Germany enacts accelerated depreciation-one
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immediate write-off for foreign investment in the country but
nowhere else. That will run afoul of WTO, I'm pretty sure, and
the Code of Conduct.
Now Ireland adopts a rule and says everybody gets one-
year depreciation, domestic and foreign. That clearly will not
run afoul because that is their general system. At least I will
argue that it will not run afoul. That is their general system,
even though most of the people around this table would say,
"wait a minute ... that's the most accelerated depreciation you
can get." So then Germany, to bring itself back into compli-
ance, enacts accelerated depreciation to domestic investment
and now it's all of a sudden okay again. Now that seems to me
a strange world where that sort of thing happens, which is
why I'm somewhat skeptical that they can proceed with the
lack of some sort of norm at some point in time. Having said
that, let me hasten to add that in the vast majority of cases,
nobody is ever going to question about it one way or the other.
Tax credits are going to be easy targets just as they are in the
U.S. Tax Expenditure Budget. Maybe I'm not correct about
that, but I have the feeling that. they may hit that point at
some time.
Secondly, just let me comment a little bit more on the
sovereignty point. I'm in agreement that a country's tax system
is an especially important issue from a sovereignty perspective.
What I'm not in agreement with is that a country can run a
tax subsidy-an export subsidy through its tax code-and all of
a sudden say that it's sovereignty for our taxes that is going to
protect this. That is where I did not see the sovereignty argu-
ment taking the day. Even though I would agree fully with you
that it should take the day where we're talking about these
other structural components of the system.
Just a final comment. I must say you made the best argu-
ment for the U.S. case I've heard with respect to the exemption
system, and perhaps that's why so many European countries
have gone to adopting some minimum rate of tax in order to
qualify for the exemption system.
CLAIRE KELLY: Thank you. Victor, did you want to take
a break now? Do we have any other comments?
VICTOR ZONANA: Any comments from the audience?
Anybody have any comments? Charlie?
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CHARLES KINGSON: Paul McDaniel said, which I never
thought of, that a source rule is a transfer pricing rule too.
And what Hugh Ault .said, which I had thought of, with the
863B, 50/50 split is really totally uneconomic when you have a
standard like a .chip like Intel which sells itself. If the World
Trade Organization is making such a big fuss about FSC, why
wouldn't they make a fuss about the foreign tax credit system
which, to me, gives much greater benefits?
PAUL MCDANIEL: About the foreign tax credit as a
whole?
CHARLES KINGSON: No, as applied with the 50/50.
PAUL MCDANIEL: Oh, well of course the World Trade
Organization doesn't consider things in the absence of some-
body else getting concerned about it. But why the European
communities aren't worried about it, I wouldn't... I don't
understand. I would have thought that they would have found
it equally or maybe worse -
CHARLES KINGSON: Yes.
PAUL MCDANIEL: - export subsidies than the FSC. But
I don't know. Hugh Ault may know more about this, but I've
never heard it raised.
REUVEN AVI-YONAH: The context that I've heard is that
if you look at the tax expenditure budget, it is a much smaller
subsidy than FSC, but there's a recent paper by Jim Hynes
that argues that there's a much bigger one, and that these
numbers are just wrong, and that they just missed the target.
My own sense is that, in general, source rules when the FSC is
more blatant than this stuff, and that's.., yes.
HUGH AULT: Nobody has brought the case yet. I think
Paul is right on that.
PHILIP WEST: Another shot at this. I'm am amateur in
this business. It seems to me the idea of a generalized export
subsidy, there's got to be something wrong with that as a view-
point. There's the difference between origin and destination
[Vol. XXVI:4
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taxes in our earlier discussion. They're economically equivalent
apart from transition, which is important, but economically
equivalent in terms of their ongoing subsidy or non-subsidy
effect in that they appear to be totally different. Some of the
conventional trade arguments are really... they've got to be
narrower than that. I don't know how to put it in that. They've
got to be narrower than that.
CLAIRE KELLY: John?
JOHN STEINES: Just one thought on this 863B issue.
Could it be distinct from the FSC regime because it runs in
both directions? We have the argument that this isn't just for
exporters. It's for importers as well, even though that's not as
important empirically.
CLAIRE KELLY: Thank you. We have some time for some
questions. Phillip and then Kees.
PHILIP WEST: I think it is good to think about things like
this. And in fact, the OECD is now working on a possible mul-
ti-lateral agreement in the information exchange area involv-
ing some jurisdictions that have committed themselves to re-
form harmful tax practices and to enter into open information
exchange relationships. What is interesting though, is although
in this discussion the terms have been used inter-changeably,
there's a lot of sensitivity in governments about the distinction
between a model bi-lateral and a multi-lateral. And they are
very different instruments and in very real ways. And the
question of whether this information exchange instrument
would be a model bi-lateral or a multi-lateral has been left
open. But at least the possibility has been left open that a
multi-lateral could result. And it is easy to criticize proposals
that are ambitious and I don't want to be guilty of what David
was warning us about: just criticizing and not working to im-
prove. But let me just go through a few issues that come to the
fore. First off, one thing that we are worried about in the Unit-
ed States in the multi-lateral exchange instrument is the deg-
radation of standards of course. And that is the central issue
in any multi-lateral agreement. You move to the lowest com-
mon denominator. One issue that is unique to the United
States that I think takes some of the juice out of this for us;
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Victor you suggested that the instrument could be used. There
have been no solutions proposed over the last two days for
evasion and avoidance; to address evasion and avoidance. In
many ways you could not use a tax treaty for constitutional
reasons in the U.S. to address evasion and avoidance because a
treaty cannot increase taxes over that which would be payable
in the absence* of a treaty. And you couldn't use a treaty, for
example, to reach agreement on a bi-lateral or multi-lateral
anti-abuse rule other than one that limited the benefits in the
treaty itself. Now, that's not to say you can't come to agree-
ments in the treaty that would be useful, but we shouldn't
ignore that very real constitutional prohibition rooted in the
fact that the House doesn't have a say in our treaties and all
revenue measures have to originate in the House. Another
larger issue is whether we want our treaties to become more
and more technical-to become more and more like statutes.
Now there has been a noticeable trend that they have been,
and that is not universally viewed as a good thing. Years ago,
the common perception had been that they have become more
general. There have been documents that guide us, more like
constitutions, if you will, rather than statutes. There's a trend
away from that. I think focusing on things like the triangular
case, like hybrid instruments, like some of the other issues you
referred to, would move us further down that road. A couple of
more technical comments . . . In your paper Victor, you re-
ferred to the problem of treaties. Bi-lateral treaties potentially
being consistent with anti-abuse rules. The U.S. position of
course, which is the position of most, at least, OECD members
is that that's not the case. Treaties are not inconsistent with
CFC rules and, in fact, the OECD committee on fiscal affairs is
about to consider a revision to the commentaries to make abso-
lutely clear that that is the case. Retroactively effective.
VICTOR THURONYI: I don't think I said they were.
PHILIP WEST: Okay. Well let me not overstate that then.
But just for the point of clarifying that. To the extent that it is
a fault of bi-lateral treaties that they're incomplete in their
coverage, from the U.S. perspective, again, that is not neces-
sarily a bad thing. We have a smaller treaty network than
many other countries and, while a larger treaty network is in
theory desirable, we don't view, as some countries do, a treaty
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as a trophy to be entered into. We're a little bit stingy with the
countries that we enter into treaties with. We use our treaty
relationships, as David said, for foreign policy purposes to
some extent. And that is not necessarily a bad thing. And you
addressed in your paper incomplete tax coverage. To state the
obvious, that's a different issue, of course, from incomplete
country coverage. And it is not clear how a multi-lateral treaty
would itself address the problem of incomplete tax coverage.
Let's see. Flexibility, you say, would be enhanced by negotiat-
ing a multi-lateral, but changes to an agreement that-and
this goes to Diane's point about how you would get agreement,
changing a document that has 100 signatories-may not be the
most flexible instrument in the world. And again I agree with
Hugh that the problem could be inconsistent interpretation,
which could be ameliorated to some extent with the multi-
lateral. But it raises some of the sovereignty issues that Diane
alluded to. From the U.S. perspective, there may not be much
to lose in light of the recent case law, and that West and oth-
ers don't seem to be going our way anyway. And finally just to
endorse what Hugh said, multi-lateral coordination is what we
need, but it is unclear to me how a multi-lateral treaty is the
right vehicle for enhancing multi-lateral cooperation. Thanks.
KEES VAN RAAD: Just a brief four points I want to raise.
I think I generally agree with the goals and the results that
Victor Thuronyi advocated, but not necessarily with the way
and the methods suggested. The first basis as far as multi-
lateral treaties are concerned-indeed if one reads closely the
Nordic convention-seems to be just a compilation of the seven
or eight treaties that they had before bi-laterally. I mean, the
saving is primarily in some of the language. But the number of
exceptions is just a compilation of the exceptions that they
have included in the bi-lateral thing. So the time within the
European Union to work efficiently towards a multi-lateral
instrument will not be there until we have arrived at some
basic harmonization; not necessarily of tax statutes or such,
but at least of policy choice we make. And in absence of that, I
do not really see how much you accomplish by just accumulat-
ing bi-lateral rules. Second observation: within the European
union, indeed at various times, they have considered to develop
a multi-lateral convention. I think right now they are working
at something much more attainable and that is a multi-lateral
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agreement that just focuses on non-discrimination between
resident and non-resident tax payers. Indeed, to eliminate as
Hugh Ault clearly described, the growing body of case law
developed by the EC court and so by taking care of the prob-
lems themselves, they are trying their hand at such an
agreement. But just focusing on non-discrimination is going to
be, if I am correctly informed, a great expansion of the OECD
Article 24-type non-discrimination clause-much more specific
and elaborate with regard to the differential treatment of non-
resident taxpayers. With regard to the role of the OECD com-
mentary and the problems which are created by the increasing
number of additions which clearly surpass the level of clarifica-
tion, I simply refer to the partnership report which is more or
less incorporated in the commentary without hardly any
change, except for Article 23 the OECD model itself. Of course,
the correct solution is one described by Hugh Ault in the Aus-
trian German treaty-that in the treaty itself you refer to the
OECD, the OECD model, and the OECD commentary. Because
the OECD commentary and the model itself are like the fa-
mous Baron Von Munchausen story, where he cannot lift him-
self from the mud by just pulling at his own hair. So you need
a higher authority to obtain the level that you are after. What
one could do--and that is something that I discussed at the
Eilat IFA (International Fiscal Association) Congress just over
a year ago-is that when the OECD arrives at a comprehen-
sive update of its commentary, since effectively the OECD
member countries subscribe to that update at that time, you
could write the update in a multi-lateral agreement and have
the countries simply sign that. And through that multi-lateral
agreement which would overwrite expressly different provi-
sions in existing bi-lateral treaties, you would accomplish the
varied result one tries now to accomplish through updating the
commentary and hoping that courts and government authori-
ties are willing to give the same weight to these updates as the
OECD Committee of Fiscal Affairs will give to it. Final obser-
vation: the international agency created by a multi-lateral
convention for interpreting the core treaty terms. In 1977, the
EC Commission issued a directive on a change of information.
And it was agreed earlier that this directive would be accompa-
nied by another directive dealing with arbitration. On the one
hand, the governments were going to get more information. On
the other hand, the taxpayers would get the means to correct
1720 [Vol. X=V:4
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any economic limitations resulting from this increase or change
in information. Well, the arbitration agreement took 13 more
years, and it was telling that the agreement was not an EC
agreement. It was just a simple multi-lateral agreement among
the EU members, and by not making it an EC agreement, the
Members kept the agreement outside the reach of the EC
court-because they were very afraid of what the court might
say of how countries were going to interpret and apply this
very convention. So this whole development doesn't make one
very optimistic about how easily countries agree on much larg-
er issues involving all sorts of treaty provisions outside of the
transfer pricing sphere. Thirty days from now, Claus Vogel will
be given a Feschrift and, in this Feschrift, I submitted a contri-
bution which outlines how long it could, in the long run, ac-
complish a result like that. And I am sort of learning from the
long way that arbitration has come to us within the European
Union, with respect to transfer pricing. I start out with a vol-
untary bi-lateral approach that countries who will set up on
the bi-lateral treaties a voluntary way of having courts and
competent authorities submit interpretation issues to a panel
of experts for the two countries. If that works well, it can be
expanded to more than two countries, and perhaps within the
European Union because the EC treaty stipulates that effective
avoidance of double taxation is a simple requirement within
the union. So, the European Union seems to be the sort of
proper organization to sponsor such an initiative. So perhaps
financially, because you know the cost of operating such a
panel will be more than the individual countries will be willing
to bear. That could also be a reason for having the European
Union take the initiative in setting up such a initially volun-
tary panel. And if it works well, and countries get comfortable
with the idea that their revenue is partially decided upon by
outside authority, that may turn into such a panel as you sug-
gested in your paper. But again, from experience within the
Union so far, I do believe that one cannot underestimate the
difficulties in countries giving up their sovereignty where tax
is concerned. That is necessarily going to be very difficult.
CLAIRE KELLY: We're a little over time now, but if
there's anything you would like to say to respond, or if there
are any other questions? Well, it is my turn to turn the mike
back over to Victor Zonana.
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